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Abstract 
The exploitation of shale gas resources is a significant issue of environmental justice. Uneven 
distributions of risks and social impacts to local site communities must be balanced against 
the economic benefits to gas users and developers; and unequal decision-making powers must 
be negotiated between local and central government, communities and fracking site 
developers. These distributive and procedural elements are addressed in relation to UK 
policy, planning, regulatory and industry development. I adopt an explicitly normative 
framework of policy evaluation; addressing a research gap on the ethics of shale gas by 
operationalising Shrader-FrechetteÕs Principle of Prima Facie Political Equality (PPFPE). I 
conclude that UK fracking policy reveals inherent contradictions of environmental justice in 
relation to the Conservative GovernmentÕs localist and planning reform agendas. Early 
fracking policy protected communities from harm in the wake of seismic risk events, but 
these were quickly replaced with pro-industry economic stimulation and planning legislation 
that curtailed community empowerment in fracking decision-making, increased 
environmental risks to communities, transferred powers from local to central government, 
and created the conditions of distributive injustices in the management of community benefit 
provisions. I argue that only by Ôre-localisingÕ the scale of fracking governance can political 
equality be ensured and the distributive and procedural environmental injustices be 
ameliorated.  
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Introduction 
The extraction of natural gas and oil from unconventional sources such as shale, 
sandstone or coal seams with high porosity but low permeability is an area of global energy 
and environmental policy significance. Following technological innovation in the USA 
towards horizontal slickwater hydraulic fracturing in the late 1990s (a technique commonly 
referred to as 'fraccing' in industry sources, and ÔfrackingÕ in activist and media sources 
Grubert 2016), the costs of unconventional fossil fuel extraction in North America dropped 
dramatically (Trembath et al. 2012). This led other advanced economies (particularly within 
the European Union, Australia and China) to seek to emulate the economic successes of the 
USA.  
In Europe, in February 2011, the European Council declared that Òin order to further 
enhance its security of [energy] supply, EuropeÕs potential for sustainable extraction and use 
of conventional and unconventional fossil fuel resources should be assessedÓ. Gas was 
recognised in the Roadmap to Renewables strategy as Òa critical fuel for the transformation of 
energy systemsÓ (Pearson et al. 2012); providing potential benefits such as increased security 
of supply from more diverse and readily available gas supplies in European markets, 
mitigation of global price shocks, cheaper gas prices for consumers (McGowan 2012, Schulz, 
Horsfield, and Sachsenhofer 2010). 
However, gaps in the geological knowledge of onshore unconventional reservoirs, 
relatively low levels of drilling investment, long lead times for construction, higher 
population densities/land prices, greater levels of state ownership of mineral rights in Europe 
(compared to the USA), and stronger environmental regulation have slowed a European shale 
boom (Moore 2012). Moreover, there is significant political divergence in the socio-political 
acceptability of shale gas at the European Member State-level, alongside hesitancy within the 
European Commission, signiﬁcant expressions of opposition within the European Parliament 
and divergent positions in the Council on the issue (McGowan 2012).  At the Member State-
level no consensus exists: France, Netherlands, Bulgaria and Germany have imposed de facto 
moratoria on shale gas developments, whereas Poland, the United Kingdom and Denmark 
have granted exploration licenses. 
In the UK, the Climate Change Act 2008 sets legally binding targets for greenhouse 
gas emissions reductions, with commitments for low carbon texhnology integration in energy 
systems. However, low carbon sources such as renewables and new nuclear are difficult to 
implement: their relative immaturity, capital intensity and low operational costs do not 
readily fit with existing electricity markets and investment templates which were designed for 
fossil fuel based energy (Bolton, Foxon, and Hall 2015). Thus, one of the primary motivating 
factors for UK Government support of fracking is the discursive construction of shale gas as 
a ÔcleanÕ (lower carbon than coal), ÔtransitionÕ or ÔbridgeÕ fuel (Cotton, Rattle, and Van 
Alstine 2014) Ð in essence a means to achieve short term CO2 reduction during the 
nuclear/renewables transition pathway. In practice, Government pro-shale policy measures 
include tax incentives, a new regulatory framework and community benefits package for 
shale gas host communities in order to stimulate investment and social acceptance (HM 
Treasury 2013a) - issues discussed in detail throughout this paper. Conservative. However, 
site specific public opposition against exploration companies, widespread criticism from 
environmental NGOs (see for example Friends of the Earth 2014) and declining public 
support (O'Hara et al. 2014), based in part upon the contentious environmental crededentials 
of the fracking process, provide a counter discourse to the pro-shale Ôtransition fuelÕ 
discourse favoured by Government (Cotton, Rattle, and Van Alstine 2014). 
 
Environmental impacts of hydraulic fracturing 
In fracking-intensive regions (particularly visible in parts of the USA and Australia), 
significant environmental and health risks have been documented, alongside growing 
political concern over inadequate regulatory mechanisms to protect public health (Centner 
and Eberhart 2015). Reported impacts include ground and surface water contamination with 
thermogenic methane, heavy metals and naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) 
(Myers 2012, Konkel 2015), drought and other forms of water stress (Rahm and Riha 2012), 
seismic activity and subsidence (Ellsworth 2013), habitat disruption (Gillen and Kiviat 2012), 
(and although restricted to the drilling phase) air, noise and light pollution related to flaring of 
gas and associated traffic-related impacts from gas pad construction and drilling (Jenner and 
Lamadrid 2013, Howarth, Santoro, and Ingraffea 2011), with associated loss of amenity value 
(Meng and Ashby 2014).  
Perhaps more significantly from an anthropogenic climate change perspective is 
concern over atmospheric fugitive methane emissions (Howarth, Santoro, and Ingraffea 2011, 
Wigley 2011) and total carbon dioxide increases relative to renewables development (Schrag 
2012). In the UK, the Committee on Climate Change concluded that ÒÔshale gas, like other 
forms of gas, cannot be regarded as a low-carbon fuel sourceÓ (CCC 2013, 10). However, a 
recent DECC report suggested that the total carbon footprint of shale gas extraction to be 
Òrelatively smallÓ (MacKay and Stone 2013), thus supporting the aforementioned transition 
or bridge fuel framing in policy (Cotton, Rattle, and Van Alstine 2014).  
At the community level, concern has been raised about wastewater disposal: 
specifically the capacity to treat large wastewater volumes given available infrastructure 
within the region of development, the socio-economic and environmental costs of wastewater 
transportation to treatment sites, treatment quality for downstream use (including drinking 
water and industrial water uses), and treatment quality to protect ecological systems (such as 
for example reducing toxicity in fish and other freshwater species from surface release of 
wastewater) (Rahm and Riha 2012). Wastewater disposal by reinjection into a fractured seam 
is a low-cost solution to deal with wastewater flowback. However, it is associated with 
environmental contamination due to leaks caused by poor borehole construction and the 
reinjection into deep wells is associated with several of the largest earthquakes in the U.S. 
midcontinent in 2011 and 2012 (Ellsworth 2013). Wastewater reinjection in the UK was 
initially banned under Environment Agency permitting guidelines (Environment Agency 
2013), though more recent draft guidance does permit wastewater re-injection for 
hydrocarbon extraction (Environment Agency 2015, 37-38). OÕDonnell et al. (2016) 
therefore caution that there is a paucity of empirical evidence into the seismic hazard posed 
by reinjection of wastewater in the UK, and recommend that an industry-accepted code of 
best practice from which regulators can reduce the risk of environmental contamination 
should be established before any flowback fluid re-injection permits are granted. 
The controversy over wastewater reinjection is related to concerns over the chemical 
content of hydraulic fracturing fluids. Though used in dilute quantities, evidence shows that 
fracking fluid additives, including biocides and surfactants, contain a range of known 
carcinogens and potentially carcinogenic materials. Ingestion of such additives can affect 
respiratory, gastro-intestinal, endocrine and central nervous systems (Colborn et al. 2011). 
The disclosure of hydraulic fracturing fluid chemical contents and their subsequent regulation 
has therefore remained a key issue of public concern in fracking politics in the USA (Maule 
et al. 2013, Fisk 2013). The UK response has been to publish industry best practice guidelines 
for operators: ensuring that they must disclose the chemical additives of fracturing fluids on a 
well-by-well basis, and this information must be made publicly available online (with 
information published here: UKOOG 2015).  
 
The environmental justice concept 
Adverse environmental and public health impacts operate alongside complex social 
and cultural effects and uneven distributions of regional and national socio-economic gains. 
Together these facets are a significant matter for environmental equity and justice analysis. It 
is necessary to examine fracking governance beyond the narrow definitions of national 
supply and demand for fossil fuels as a public good, to focus upon attendant positive and 
negative socio-economic and environment effects to local communities and to the 
involvement of community actors in environmental decision-making. The concept of 
environmental justice and the related notion of energy justice (see for example Sovacool 
2013) connotes both grassroots political activism and academic analysis of environmental 
rights, racism and classism, the fair distribution of risks weighed against socio-economic 
benefits, and the protection of community voice, political, socio-cultural and place identities 
(Schlosberg 2007, Agyeman and Evans 2004, Agyeman 2005).  
Environmental justice is Òintensely geographicalÓ (Walker and Bulkeley 2006), yet 
also a matter of philosophical concern: relating to fairness in both the distribution of 
outcomes and the processes by which outcomes are decided. As a problem of distributional 
fairness it is important to evaluate the geographical and scalar dimensions of impacts, for 
example when the aforementioned environmental risks from extraction activities become 
concentrated within particular localities (such as marginalised post-industrial or rural regions) 
whilst broader benefits from fuel extraction and energy use (such as fuel profits, tax revenues 
and energy security) are spread to those outside of affected communities. Furthermore, 
fracking-affected communities at risk of economic marginalisation and industrial decline, 
become subject to rapid skilled labour migration from outside the community, which can 
have negative social and cultural repercussions (the so called 'boomtown' effect, see for 
example: Mercer, de Rijke, and Dressler 2014, Jacobsen and Parker 2014).  
Environmental justice also concerns issues of procedure. It is not solely outcomes-
based (who is affected and how), but also process-based. It concerns how decisions are made, 
who is involved, what responsibilities they hold, what power they wield, and what 
institutional structures influence the context in which decisions are made. Achieving fair 
fracking involves assessing the dualistic relationship between distributive and procedural 
elements. Procedural concerns link directly to distributive concerns because central and local 
government institutional apparatus and political context influence the just allocation of 
environmental harms and economic benefits within society (Schlosberg 2007, Kaswan 2002). 
Fair outcomes are dependent upon establishing fairness, honesty, accountability and 
transparency in the processes that resolve disputes, distribute environmental risks and allocate 
resources (Lawrence, Daniels, and Stankey 1997). 
 
Normative environmental justice: The Principle of Prima Facie Political Equality 
In this paper I examine the policy, planning and regulatory instruments relevant to 
fracking development in the United Kingdom. As Evans (forthcoming) notes in a recent 
review paper, that despite a rapid expansion in the literatures on the societal dimensions of 
shale gas, there remains a paucity of studies into the normative ethical dimensions of fracking 
policy and practice. In response to this research gap, I adapt an ethical framework for policy 
evaluation based upon Shrader-FrechetteÕs (2002) Principle of Prima Facie Political Equality 
(hereafter PPFPE); one that directly addresses the interrelationship between distributive and 
procedural elements of environmental justice. 
Shrader-FrechetteÕs central concern is that threats to equality and informed consent 
commonly underlie violations of environmental justice. The PPFPE is a response to this 
concern Ð it is an ethical position grounded in RawlsÕs (1999) philosophy of justice-as-
fairness, and DworkinÕs (1978, 1988) notion of political equality, whereby all citizens are 
given equal consideration and concern with respect to decisions over distributive outcomes. 
In the PPFPE Òequality is defensible and that only different or unequal treatment requires 
justificationÓ, in the sense that the onus for justifying environmental risks rests with those 
proposing potentially environmentally damaging developments, not those opposing them. 
ÒEquality of treatment under the lawÓ is a key component, and it is Òproportional to the 
strength of oneÕs claims to itÓ; i.e. in practice this may vary according to individual 
circumstances, compensation due to oneÕs individual needs, or societyÕs general interest in 
providing incentives for certain kinds of actions. Distributive justice is defined as Òmorally 
proper apportionment of benefits and burdensÓ (if environmental harm occurs equality is 
therefore ensured through economic redistribution or else by providing equality of economic 
opportunity in return). This then relates to a concurrent need for participative justice (a form 
of procedural justice) involving Òinstitutional and procedural norms that guarantee all people 
equal opportunity for consideration in decision-makingÓ. This second facet requires that 
Òstakeholder and expert deliberation [be] given equal weightÓ and that heterogeneous 
stakeholders including affected citizens be given Òthe same rights to consent, due process, 
and compensation that medical patients haveÓ: it is unethical to expose people to 
environmental risks without first obtaining autonomous free, informed, competent and 
autonomous consent, free of coercion, with access to relevant information concerning the 
risks/harms, capability to understand the relevant information and use it individual decision-
making (all of the above from Shrader-Frechette 2002, 24-29, 77).  
To summarise, I distill four component elements (or sub-principles) that underpin the 
PPFPE: 
1.! That the onus for justifying the impositions of environmental health burdens 
on individuals, rests with the polluter/developer/proponent, not with the 
opponent of development. 
2.! That equal rights are asserted under that law and that unequal treatment must 
therefore be compensated for (primarily through economic means of wealth 
redistribution or increased community economic opportunity). 
3.! That stakeholders including heterogeneous publics must have access to 
information about environmental impacts and harms. 
4.! The affected communities, and other stakeholder groups including 
heterogeneous ÔpublicsÕ must have access to participatory processes over 
environmental decision-making free from coercion and that affected 
individuals must give free, informed and autonomous consent to 
environmental degradation given all of the aforementioned criteria. 
 
The PPFPE is valuable to the evaluation of the ethical dimensions of environmental 
justice, given the integrative nature of the principle Ð it allows the articulation of participative 
and distributive dimensions in concert with one another. The model I propose here, uses the 
four aforementioned elements of the principle as an Ôevaluative yardstickÕ that facilitates 
discussion of the normative ethical implications of UK fracking policy, planning and industry 
development.   
 
Element 1 - Justifying environmental harm - from moratorium to Òall out for shale gasÓ 
In the UK, the shale gas industry is primarily at the exploratory stage rather than 
commercially profitable extraction. In 2011 a nationwide moratorium was imposed due to 
seismic tremors experienced near to Blackpool in Lancashire, Northwest England. At this 
point, Government implicitly upheld this first element of the PPFPE. Development was 
halted nation-wide based upon a concern for potential localised harm, and it was then up to 
the industry to prove that fracking could be done with sufficient safeguards in place. An 
influential Royal Society and Academy of Engineering report followed shortly after (Bickle 
et al. 2012); alongside an industry investigation of seismic risk factors (Green, Styles, and 
Baptie 2012). Government concluded form this evidence that shale gas could be managed 
safely in the UK if best practice regulatory safeguards were strictly adhered to. Critics have 
since argued that this technical approach to managing fracking risk is favoured by policy 
makers, though lacks broader public and stakeholder support (Williams et al. 2015). Given 
the lack of epidemiological evidence over long term health risks, it behoves Governments to 
avoid Ôfalse negativesÕ Ð essentially to take a precautionary approach in response to a lack of 
evidence, as protecting the public from serious harm from potential environmental risks from 
fracking takes precedence over enhancing its welfare through economic regeneration (de 
Melo-Martn, Hays, and Finkel 2014). Nonetheless, in December 2013 the moratorium was 
lifted and the Government quickly moved to promote industry expansion through a policy 
platform described by Prime Minister David Cameron as Ôgoing all out for shaleÕ (Watt 
2014): implying that shale gas was a public good for energy security and job growth, thus 
presenting a normative political argument for Government support of the industry.  
The Ôall out for shaleÕ strategy began under the former Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat Coalition Government that introduced specific policy mechanisms to stimulate 
development through tax breaks for industry and local councils, to benefit local communities 
through compensation and profit sharing measures and the promise of local employment, and 
to streamline applications for consent by pushing for fracking-related planning reform. What 
we see from a PPFPE perspective is that since the reversal of the moratorium in 2013 
Government has sought to provide community assurances that environmental harm would not 
match that experienced in other countries (notably the USA). Prime Minister David Cameron 
went on record stating: 
"What I would say is recovering unconventional gas will only go ahead with stringent 
environmental safeguardsÉ I hope that reassures people there is no danger of some 
dash into technology without the safeguards in place and real payback for local 
people, in terms of the Community Payback scheme." (Blackpool Gazette 2015).  
The stringency of environmental regulation is a politically contentious point. In 
practice, both conventional onshore and unconventional onshore extraction are regulated 
under the Petroleum Act 1998, with a regulatory model involving independently owned 
operators bidding for exclusive drilling rights directly from the Department of Energy & 
Climate Change (DECC) through a Petroleum Exploration and Development License 
(PEDL). The license doesnÕt grant rights of access, nor rights for commercial extraction of 
hydrocarbons. Licensees must also obtain any consent under current legislation, including 
necessary planning permissions from local authorities under the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1990/The Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997 (as appropriate). Licensees 
wishing to enter or drill through coal seams for coalbed methane and coal mine gas must also 
seek the permission of the Coal Authority. Until recently, local authority planning permission 
was required, though licensees must still ensure receipt of necessary environmental permits 
(obtained from the Environment Agency in England, Department of Environment in Northern 
Ireland, Natural Resources Wales in Wales, or the Scottish Environment Protection Agency 
in Scotland) which include additional permits where hydraulic fracturing is used, when 
compared to conventional onshore extraction (DECC 2013b). Regulations provide specific 
safeguards for groundwater protection, the assessment and approval of hydraulic fracturing 
fluid chemicals, the treatment and disposal of mining waste and NORM and the disposal of 
waste gases through flaring. Operators must also notify the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) of the well design and operation plans in advance of drilling (all detail from DECC 
2013b). These regulatory instruments cover individual developer applications, though 
financial regulation of the industry sits within The Office of Unconventional Gas and Oil 
(OUGO): a part of DECCÕs Energy Development Unit.  
From this policy guidance the market for extractive activities is developer-led, but 
within a framework of permits tailored to regulate air, land and water contamination, disposal 
of waste, and drilling safety. Government argues that this sufficiently justifies the 
development of fracking industries, as risks are reduced along Ôas low as reasonably 
practicable (ALARP)Õ principles. However, on a broader level of policy, a number of 
problems remain. Turney (2013), for example, notes that under the over-arching National 
Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) there are complex and contradictory environmental 
protection elements within the policy guidance, given the nested levels of consents involved: 
national licences for extraction, local authority planning permission, environmental permits, 
health and safety checks, and landowner permission for access. Furthermore, there is little 
clarity on the different types of regulatory authority involved at different stages of 
development (what industry classifies as exploration, appraisal and production Ð notably 
there is no mention of remediation/restoration within the sateges of development used by 
industry, see:  United Kingdom Onshore Oil and Gas 2013). Such gaps in the guidance, and 
potential conflicts mean that accountability and scrutiny of regulatory authorities is curtailed, 
and environmental organisations including Friends of the Earth have questioned whether the 
GovernmentÕs assurances of safety through environmental regulation are sufficient. They call 
for a bespoke regulatory regime to overcome institutional complexity and the potential risks 
of regulatory capture (see for example Friends of the Earth 2014); thus ensuring that industry 
governance is coordinated and sufficiently robust to ensure public confidence in 
environmental protection measures, and hence trust in industry operations and the broader 
public justification of fracking activities. This issue remains currently unresolved, and from a 
PPFPE perspective, undermines the need for the amelioration and public justification of 
harm, and for autonomous community consent in the face of such harms given the ambiguity 
of environmental protection regimes that surround industry development.   
 
Element 2 Ð Equality through economic redistribution Ð The Community Payback 
Scheme  
The Ôall out for shaleÕ policy platform began with the Spending Round (ÒThe 
BudgetÓ) of 2013 (HM Treasury 2013b). Economic measures included 100% business rate 
recovery from fracking operations for local authorities (double the existing 50% rate), 
resulting in an estimated £1.7 million per annum to local authorities for a typical shale gas 
site (effectively subsidised by central government) (Prime Minister's Office 2014b); 
alongside promises to use tax revenues generated from fracking to create a Sovereign Wealth 
Fund for investment in the North of England (though the exact details on this latter point do 
not appear in current Government policy documentation). They simultaneously emphasised 
the employment benefits, specifically an estimated 16,000Ð32,000 new full time equivalent 
positions (including direct, indirect and induced jobs), creating an increase of up to 7% in the 
level of employment supported by the UK oil and gas industry sector (Rural Community 
Policy Unit 2014). Furthermore, MP Amber Rudd, Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change states that Government will sponsor a ÒNational College for Onshore Oil and Gas, 
headquartered in Blackpool, to make sure we get the maximum benefit from the resource and 
young people have the skills they need to benefit from the new jobs createdÓ (Rudd 2015). 
GovernmentÕs aim is to improve local skill development within areas most likely affected by 
future fracking industry, and potentially alleviating the potential for Òboom-townÓ threats of 
social decline resulting from rapid external labour migration into an existing economically 
depressed region (see for example Jacobsen and Parker 2014), and thus providing a policy 
mechanism to ensure greater economic equality of opportunity for affected communities. 
As DECC (2014) note, the benefit provisions to local communities are ensured 
through The United Kingdom Onshore Operators Group's (UKOOG) voluntary charter. The 
charter emphasises the redistributive community benefits from the different stages fracking 
development, and all onshore oil and gas company member organisations of the industry 
group (including conventional and unconventional onshore oil and gas exploration) must 
adhere to the guidance in the charter. The charter ensures that each well pad should be 
accompanied by a £100,000 payment to Òthe local communityÓ, plus 1% of future revenues 
split between the local community and the local authority (DECC 2013a). UKOOG state in 
their community engagement charter that this will be split 2/3rd to the local community and 
1/3rd at the county level; in total equivalent to payments of between £3 million and £12 
million. A further £2.4-£4.8 million per site (or nearly £0.6 billion in total) could be 
generated in a production phase (thus accounting for the 1% contribution from revenue over 
the lifetime of each well). Former Energy and Climate Change Minister Michael Fallon 
declared that:  
ÒWe already knew that the development of shale gas could bring growth, jobs and 
energy security to the country, and now local councils and people will benefit from 
millions of pounds of additional investment.Ó (Prime Minister's Office 2014a). 
There are a number of factors to consider in the evaluation of these economic 
redistributive claims. Firstly, the benefits payments are not a universal aspect of all 
exploration activities, as some companies such as Ineos have not pledged community 
ompensation (Gosden 2015). Thus, although Government are keen to stress the role of the 
community payback scheme, this is a voluntary scheme as fracking companies are not 
required to become members of UKOOG (it is an industry body not a regulator). Secondly, 
the figures over the lifetime of each well (with approximate 20 year operating lives) are 
ambiguous, given the geographical differences in production rates, and the continuing 
volatility of gas resource values within international energy markets. Thirdly, under this 
charter and associated policy guidance from DECC there remains a lack of detail on the 
mechanisms through which payments are made, or how they will be assured over the longer 
term. Fourthly, it is unclear if landowners would receive direct payments in a manner akin to 
federally protected royalty payments in the USA, nor whether these sums would be provided 
in cash or partly as benefits in kind (e.g. upgrading local infrastructure). The 1% figure would 
also affect communities differently based upon population density, as individuals within rural 
communities would likely receive much higher per capita benefits than those in urban/peri-
urban communities (if the figures are capped at £100,000 + 1% revenue). It is also 
noteworthy to compare these amounts distributed to a community (however that is defined) to 
those found in the USA (Pennsylvania sets a minimum royalty payment at 12.5%, with the 
US national average at 18.5%, see Schreiber 2013), calling frackingÕs detractors to question 
the value for money to local communities given the potential profitability of the industry.  
In some respects, the redistributive dimensions go some way towards fulfilling the 
second dimension of the PPFPE: by dividing the revenues as a community rather than private 
individual benefit this potentially redresses economic injustice inherent to split estate mineral 
regimes, whereby land owners providing access gain cash benefits and those directly or 
indirectly affected by horizontal drilling tend to disproportionately suffer the burdens. 
However, without a clear mechanism for distributing such revenues fairly amongst affected 
communities, distributive injustices may still occur. This is in part a problem of failure to 
effectively define ÒcommunityÓ. Injustices may occur when a community is defined by 
spatial proximity (homeowners situated closest to the well pad for example), or role 
involvement (such as payments given to members of social movements of opposition) (see 
for example Cass, Walker, and Devine-Wright 2010).  
Similarly, clearer guidelines on the format of payments is needed: specifically 
identifying what types of ÒinfrastructureÓ might be built from the proceeds. Community 
payback is potentially divisive where decision-making over expenditure is not independently 
facilitated. Much clearer mandates to industry and local councils are needed in order to 
prevent potential social conflict within development-affected communities. Moreover, as 
with any risk-bearing industry providing benefits-in-kind, the type, scale and timing of 
payments is of considerable ethical concern.  Providing upfront incentives for economically 
marginalised communities raises the possibility of community bribery (Cotton 2013, Cass, 
Walker, and Devine-Wright 2010), particularly as economic austerity measures under the 
Conservative Government shrink revenues for local authorities and create pressure for public 
sector organisations to seek new and alternative sources of income. Local authority support 
for the industry then becomes increasingly framed as a solution to existing economic 
deprivation (Walker et al. 2005) and hence is a potentially coercive factor, undermining the 
autonomous of affected communities under the PPFPE.  
Economic injustices are exacerbated by the scale and geographical distributive justice 
dimensions of fracking site-selection. Due to the geological distribution of unconventional 
sources Lancashire, Cheshire, South and North Yorkshire, South and Central Scotland the 
Midlands and South Wales will be most affected (for further interest the Oil & Gas Authority 
maintains an interactive GIS map of PEDL licenses for consultation on the spatial 
distribution of potential fracking sites)
i
. The geographic distribution of fossil fuel reserves has 
created path-dependent effects on urban industrial development. Shale and coal bed resources 
are primarily situated in regions that previously extracted conventional fossil fuel resources 
(such as coal during the industrial revolution), with primary regions under consideration 
being the Bowland-Hadder gas play runs across central England from Cheshire to Yorkshire, 
and the Jurassic shales in the Weald basin in southeast England (Smith, Turner, and Williams 
2010, Schulz, Horsfield, and Sachsenhofer 2010). 
Though fracking is determined primarily by the geographic pattern of shale resources, 
the prioritisation of certain places as extraction sites involves an element of normative 
political judgement. Notable in this regard was Conservative peer and former Energy 
Secretary Lord HowellÕs comments in the House of Lords in August 2013, whereby he 
construed shale gas as suitable for ÒdesolateÓ regions that he described as "unloved places 
that are not environmentally sensitive", mentioning Lancashire specifically. This is a clear 
example of what Schlosberg (2007) terms recognition-related environmental injustice: 
regional place-related inequity based around social constructions of fracking as suitable for 
the aforementioned industrial/northern/Scottish/Welsh regions rather than affluent (southern 
constituencies) such as Balcombe in Sussex Ð a site of significant protest against onshore oil 
and gas exploration from anti-fracking social movements, even when no hydraulic fracturing 
was proposed (for further details of the Balcombe case and its impact see: O'Hara et al. 
2013). Such discourse potentially prioritises the needs of citizens with affluent southeastern 
or rural identities over economically marginalised northern or urban identities.  
Where recognition injustices occur, Community Payback can become a proxy 
instrument for enacting distributive injustice between regions. The local authority business 
rate increases, profit sharing and investment in skill development (such as the Blackpool 
college) strategies are consistent with Conservative localist politics under the ÒBig SocietyÓ 
agenda. Economic incentives act as proxies for traditional redistributive approaches to 
community infrastructure development, essentially replacing state subsidisation of 
community assets with a neoliberal investment approach to local socio-economic 
development (Bentley and Pugalis 2013). Areas of existing socio-economic marginalisation 
then become at risk of being disproportionately targeted by developers that assume weaker 
political opposition to site selection. If successful the degraded environmental quality and 
associated technological stigma (see Castn Broto et al. 2010) form fracking worsens the 
socio-economic conditions for affected communities, creating a vicious cycle as  
communities then become further dependent upon the gas revenue stream and associated 
benefits payments Ð a process referred to as peripheralisation (Blowers and Leroy 1994). 
A related concern is that where inequalities exist within socio-economically 
heterogeneous communities, the affluent, socially-mobile and politically active citizens will 
frequently have more power within local negotiation processes over economic benefit 
distribution. Individuals with high levels of social and political capital may ostensibly 
welcome fracking into their community (but only within areas populated by economically and 
politically marginalised community groups) under the banner of good citizenship. Privately, 
they then deploy political capital to lobby for a disproportionately higher share of the benefits 
within a community payback scheme. If their influence on negotiation is unsuccessful, then 
they have greater resource capacity to move away from affected areas whilst those in less 
socially advantageous positions are less able to do so. An ethically acceptable fracking 
community payback scheme under the PPFPE must therefore ensure political safeguards for 
communities suffering multiple indicators of socio-economic deprivation. This is important 
first, so that they do not become economically coerced into accepting environmental risks in 
exchange for local infrastructure development in absence of other forms of local and central 
government funding; and second, so that they do not lose out in negotiation processes to 
those with greater political capital. At present no such mechanism exists within the 
community benefits provision espoused by UKOOGÕs charter or DECC/BIS policy guidance, 
as both unequivocally construe community benefits positively, without detailing mechanisms 
to protect against potentially adverse rebound effects.  
 
Element 3 Ð Access to information - Localism and the community engagement charter 
The Ôall out for shaleÕ policy platform has been a significant driver of UK planning 
reform. Like the Planning Act 2008 and Localism Act 2011, recent changes to planning 
guidance aim to streamline development control. They transfer decision-making to the 
relevant Secretary of State transferring powers from local to central government, whilst 
mandating developer-led community consultation programmes prior to planning consent. 
Hilson (2015) notes that under current Planning Practice Guidance (PPG), fracking 
developers are ÔencouragedÕ to carry out pre-application engagement with local communities, 
though this is only mandatory for onshore wind developers. UKOOGÕs community 
engagement charter does make reference to engagement at different stages of fracking 
development (exploration, appraisal and production), and UKOOG affiliated developers must 
abide by it in order to maintain their affiliation. The charter has the principal aim of 
generating: ÒGreater understanding and involvement by communities in unlocking the UKÕs 
energy potentialÓ. They promise to ÒEngage with local communities, residents and other 
stakeholders at each of the three stages of operationsÓ. The engagement charter is, however, 
based around information provision and limited consultation; whereby developer must agree 
to:  
 
ÒEnsure there is a continued point of contact for local communities and that they 
provide sufficient opportunity for comment and feedback on initial plans, listen to 
concerns and respond appropriately and promptlyÉ [and]É Explain openly and 
honestly drilling, hydraulic fracturing, operational practices including any 
environmental, safety, or health risks and how they are addressed to ensure that the 
local community gains a clear understanding of the process including benefits and 
risks associated with the proposed operationsÓ (United Kingdom Onshore Oil and 
Gas 2013) 
 
Though the charter adopts the language of engagement, the practices espoused within 
the charter are more akin to information provision and limited site-related community 
feedback, which under ArnsteinÕs (1969) ladder of participation framework, would appear to 
suggest a tokenistic response to community empowerment in the decision process. The early 
engagement rhetoric is therefore indicative of Ôdeliberative speakÕ (Hindmarsh and Matthews 
2008): the charter uses language of active, early stage community engagement, though the 
positive attitude is not backed up participation mechanisms that provide community 
empowerment or decisional influence. Notably absent is the opportunity for locally affected 
communities to question the Ôneed caseÕ for fracking activities, and thus cannot actively 
provide or withhold informed consent, hence violating the third element of the PPFPE.  
The charter provides no codified set of engagement practices, nor methods that 
fracking developers are obligated to use. This means that the actual methods utilised by 
developers will tend to allow them to nominally meet their statutory requirements for public 
involvement whilst effectively continuing to dispense predetermined management decisions. 
(Johnstone 2014). This has been seen in practice in other energy-related projects where 
developers use mechanisms such as public exhibitions, online/telephone surveys and 
comment periods (Cotton and Devine-Wright 2012a) whilst foregoing deliberative 
mechanisms of community decision-making input to provide community consent.  
 
Element 4 - Public participation and informed consent Ð the planning reform agenda 
Moving from industry practice to national policy, of great significance to planning 
reform for fracking is The Infrastructure Bill (which received Royal Assent to become the 
Infrastructure Act 2015 on 12 February 2015). The legislative aim continues a planning 
policy legislative agenda that began under the former Labour Government with The Planning 
Act 2008, and continued under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government 
with Localism Act 2011. These policy instruments were developed against a background of 
long-running and antagonistic public inquiries which delayed the construction of major 
infrastructure projects; notable examples include the Sizewell B nuclear power station 
(O'Riordan, Kemp, and Purdue 1988), the Lackenby-Picton-Shipton and Beualy-Denny 
electricity transmission lines, and Heathrow Terminal 5 (Cotton 2011), and a seemingly 
urgent requirement to ensure new nuclear build to meet carbon emissions reduction targets 
(Johnstone 2010) Ð thus planning powers were rescaled to the level of state control over site-
specific planning development for infrastructure plans deemed to be of national significance 
(Cotton 2014, Marshall 2013). Although dressed in the rhetoric of localism, in practice critics 
suggest such systems serve to reinforce a hierarchically organised political-administrative 
structures to create a top-down planning system (Johnstone 2014). 
The Infrastructure Act 2015 is a continuation of this policy agenda. The principal aim 
was to Ôget Britain buildingÕ (particularly in relation to house building and high speed rail 
networks).  It alters the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 in a way that further 
streamlines elements of current planning procedure, with the intention of accelerating 
development by ending excessive delays on projects that already have planning permission. 
With regards to fracking, the act makes significant and specific changes to planning consent 
regimes. Since Royal Assent, it provides an automatic right of access for exploration 
companies to deep level land (300m or lower below the surface) for the purposes of 
exploiting fossil fuels or geothermal energy. This includes conventional and unconventional 
resources.  
Surface landowners including private householders and businesses will no longer be 
able to unduly object to fracking operations that drill horizontally under homes of the basis of 
legal infringement due to trespass (in sections 43-48 of the Act), counter to the 2010 Bocardo 
SA v Star Energy [2010] UKSC 35 case, where The Supreme Court upheld the decision that 
prima facie a landowner owns everything below the surface, is deemed to be in possession of 
it, and can sue for damages for subterranean trespasses. The Infrastructure Act overturns this 
decision in case law; fundamentally changing the land rights of citizens in a manner that 
benefits industry interests over private citizen interests. Developers are given the right to 
leave the deep level land in a different condition than before the right for extraction was 
exercised, which includes leaving any substance (such as fracking fluids) or infrastructure 
(such as wellbore casings to maintain the structural integrity of the well) in the land itself, 
though liability for any loss or damage attributable to the exercise of these rights by another 
person is expressly removed from resting with the landowner.  
Given the controversial nature of these planning changes, the original billÕs passage 
through the House of Commons and the House of Lords was stymied by political opposition 
both inside Parliament and from outside protestors. It began passage in the House of Lords on 
5th June 2014, taking a total of 13 sessions in the Lords and 16 in the Commons. Labour 
MPs, and Green MP Caroline Lucas in particular, asserted that not enough time was allowed 
to debate or vote on the sections related to fracking, raising concerns that post-political 
decision-making as a form of democratic deficit was at work, whereby business interests are 
not subject to sufficient public scrutiny before laws are passed (see Swyngedouw 2007 in 
particular for discussion of this point). Anti-fracking campaigners were, of course, concerned 
about measures contained within and called for an Environmental Audit Committee Report 
and the instigation of a moratorium on fracking, principally on the basis that it undermines 
commitment to national climate change targets. In the UK, The Climate Act 2008 sets a duty 
for the Secretary of State to ensure that the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 is at 
least 80% lower than the 1990 baseline. Opponents argued that the extraction of a significant 
new source of onshore oil and gas would run contrary to this goal, whilst simultaneously 
exposing communities to additional health and environmental exposure risks.  
Of additional concern is the role of fracking under the National Planning Policy 
Framework (NPPF). Under the NPPF, minerals planning policy for onshore oil and gas and 
the determination of planning applications for conventional and unconventional onshore oil 
and gas activities, was to rest with the Minerals Planning Authorities (MPAs), such that 
decisions were to be taken in accordance with local plans (an issue that is under threat due to 
planning policy changes discussed below). In NPPF terms, however a tension emerges in that 
permitted planning must meet sustainable development goals. Given the contentious role of 
new fossil fuels in potentially exacerbating climate change risks, a pro-onshore 
unconventional fossil fuel policy platform has a contentious status within the NPPF, thus 
providing further opportunities for opposition movements to rescale the spaces of 
engagement with fracking policy to national planning policy.  
Of further concern are legislative changes to trespass laws that occurred despite 
overwhelming opposition. In the QueenÕs speech Government declared that changes to 
trespass laws would be subject to Ò[a] full consultation on this policy and the legislation is 
entirely dependent on the outcome of that consultationÓ (Prime Minister's Office 2014c). Yet 
of the 40,647 responses to a Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) consultation 
on the move to give oil and gas companies underground access without needing to seek 
landownersÕ permission, 99% of respondents opposed the measures. Even when DECC 
subtracted what they termed ÒcampaignÓ responses that included freeform text opposing 
fracking more generally, to examine those that responded specifically to the questions posed 
in the consultation questionnaire, of the remaining 4,065 responses a total of 92% opposed 
the proposed underground access legislation (Department of Energy and Climate Change 
2014). These measures remained within the bill, however, raising further criticism that the 
legislative changes lack demcratic legitimacy, ignoring consultation responses and creating 
significant democratic deficits in planning policy.   
Despite political opposition and internal policy contradiction, Government 
successfully defended the bill against calls for a moratorium. However, following Labour-
Green rebellion, a series of amendments were inserted specifically to provide additional 
environmental protections in law. The Infrastructure Act 2015 amends Section 4 of the 
Petroleum Act 1998 to provide the Secretary of State (as the authority granting fracking 
licences) to impose local planning constraints including assurances that the environmental 
impacts of fracking (including the relevant well) have been taken into account by the local 
planning authority (including cumulative effects from multiple fracking operations); to 
confirm whether planning authorities have imposed restoration conditions after fracking 
operations are complete; and that the public have been given notice of the application for 
relevant planning permission. In addition, they must provide notice of regulatory approval, 
including independent inspection of well integrity. They must provide assurances that 
thermogenic methane in groundwater has been monitored for at least twelve months before 
fracking begins and that fugitive methane emissions to the atmosphere are monitored. 
Fracking fluids must be approved (or be subject to approval) by the relevant regulatory 
authorities (The Environment Agency in England, the Scottish Environmental Protection 
Agency in Scotland, Natural Resources Wales in Wales). Moreover, the Act provides 
constraints to developments in protected areas including groundwater protection zones and 
National Parks, though other protected areas such as Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty 
(AONB) do not have the same protections. A notable example of this is the Wytch Farm 
region in Dorset, Southwest England (the largest onshore oil and gas field in Western 
Europe). Though these latter measures provide some ecological protections for National 
Parks, they may inadvertently produce anthropocentric environmental distributive injustices Ð 
pushing fracking operations closer to densely populated urban areas and increasing the 
propensity for human exposure to fracking-related risks; alongside institutional prioritisation 
of rural place identities in regions of high amenity, compared to those within existing 
industrial regions, which, as already mentioned, recognises and prioritises certain place 
identities over others.  
It is important to note that these protections are under further political threat. In a 
letter from ministers to Chancellor George Osborne, leaked to the Guardian newspaper in 
February 2016 (cited in Vaughan 2016), it was stated that: 
ÒOne of our top priorities will be to examine what work is required to ensure that the 
safeguarding provisions in the [Infrastructure] Act do not inadvertently create fresh 
barriers to exploration and to minimise the delays that the requirements in the act 
have introduced.Ó 
In essence, the Ôall out for shaleÕ political strategy is prioritised, with the 
Infrastructure ActÕs existing environmental safety provisions perceived by some 
Conservative ministers as unduly restrictive to industry expansion. Moreover, opportunities 
for public involvement in decision-making are likely to be further curtailed by recent political 
developments. The Government will now, through Communities Minister Greg Clark, draft 
new guidance for planning authorities aim at fast-tracking fracking decisions, thus draw 
further planning powers back to central government. The principle motivating factor appears 
to be a successive round of rejected planning applications for shale and coal seam exploration 
applications on issues of noise and air pollution (notably in Lancashire, for details see 
Lancashire County Council 2015). This comes against a background of changing planning 
rules for renewables (including onshore wind farms) that ensure local communities have a 
greater say over project applications in affected communities. As a wider concern, these rules 
for enabling fracking development must be contextualised in broader changes to energy 
policy strategy within Government, as the Conservatives move away from Premium Feed-in 
Tariffs (FiTs) for renewable electricity supply (Newbery in press), alongside cuts to 
renewable energy subsidies and incentives for onshore wind and solar power, the withdrawal 
of the Climate Change Levy exemption for renewables and the scrapping of the requirement 
for new homes to be zero carbon from April 2016 (Persaud 2016). There is, therefore, a 
degree of policy inconsistency on the participative justice dimensions of decision-making 
control for fracking projects when compared to renewable alternatives. Government stress 
that the underlying rationale is that (Department of Energy & Climate Change 2015).:  
ÒIf planning applications for shale exploration developments take months or even 
years it can create uncertainty for communities and prevent the development of a 
potentially vital national industryÓ  
In November 2015 it was announced that the Communities Minister now has the 
power to intervene in hearing appeals against planning decisions related to shale gas projects 
if it is deemed that local authorities are taking too long to make a decision. This intervention 
would specifically affect CaudrillaÕs recent fracking applications in Lancashire. Writing a 
letter in the Blackpool Gazette, Clark (cited in Berentzen 2015) announced that: 
ÒThe reason for this direction is because the drilling appeals involve proposals for 
exploring and developing shale gas which amount to proposals for development of 
major importance having more than local significance and proposals which raise 
important or novel issues of development control, and/or legal difficulties.Ó 
In 2016, a 10-page plan to integrate shale gas fracking activities into the Ônationally 
significant infrastructure planning (NSIP)Õ process (under The Planning Act 2008 and 
Localism Act 2011) was leaked to the Telegraph newspaper, described as a Ôplot to foil anti-
frackersÕ (Hope 2016). These collective measures, to dilute environmental protection 
provisions for national parks, and to withdraw powers from councils and to ultimately 
integrate shale extraction into the NSIP  process, are fundamentally grounded in a planning 
modernisation and streamlining political agenda (Cowell and Owens 2006). In essence, 
Government construes planning authorities as obstacles to economic development that need 
to be overcome by reducing decision times and minimising opportunities for multi-
stakeholder deliberation (including input from heterogeneous publics). Planning is portrayed 
by Government either as a form of bureaucratic inefficiency or as a form of delaying tactic 
for non-decision-making. This, in turn, reinforces a national interest justification for 
removing local decision-making powers in spite of the inherent participative injustices that 
result. By drawing power away from local planning authorities and simultaneously reducing 
their income (and thus reducing their resource capacity for efficient appraisal of project 
proposals), this creates further potential democratic deficits if they are unable to scrutinise 
proposal within central government-mandated decision timeframes. I conclude that such an 
agenda reveals an inherent paradox within the localist politics espoused by Government, as it 
acts to curtail opportunities for local deliberation and decision-making control in contrast to 
the political promise of community control espoused in the Localism Act 2011. 
 
Discussion and policy recommendations 
 The aim of this article is to examine the normative environmental justice dimensions 
of the UKÕs fracking policy, regulatory and planning developments. By applying The 
Principle of Prima Facie Political Equality (Shrader-Frechette 2002), I link distributive 
elements around the justification of harm and economic compensatory benefits with the 
participative elements of autonomous consent and multi-stakeholder dialogue within fracking 
policy processes and developer-led site selection. Shrader-Frechette argues that it behoves 
Governmental and industry organisations to fulfil twin distributive and participative justice 
requirements in order to provide ethical legitimacy to the decision-making processes and 
outcomes for environmentally damaging industry developments. Such analysis is vital in the 
normative evaluation of the fast moving and adaptive political processes surrounding the 
expansion of this fledgling industry. 
 In conclusion, I argue that there is a conflicting and contradictory picture of political 
equality in fracking-related environmental justice. In terms of the justification of harm 
element, of note are numerous early positive developments within Government: the nation-
wide moratorium following early seismic activity events was a clear example of the principle 
at work. Government halted all fracking until developers could publicly prove that seismic 
risks were minimised along ALARP principles. In this sense, the duty for local community 
risk protection over private economic interest was upheld, and the Ôburden of proofÕ lay with 
the industry to justify development activities. However, once seismic risk protection 
reassurance was provided to Government, they immediately reversed their position from 
moratorium to rapid expansion, whilst avoiding explicit consideration of all other identified 
risk factors to air, water, land use and climate change. The GovernmentÕs argument was that 
stringent regulation (defined as ÔstringentÕ particular through comparison with the regulatory 
environment seen in early USA fracking) provided public justification for rapid fracking 
development, though critics including environmental NGOs, cite the lack of a clear, 
independent regulatory framework specifically for fracking activities, and conflicting levels 
of consents regimes and risks of regulatory capture. Implicitly in line with the PPFPE, 
Government should reconsider clarification and simplification of the regulatory framework 
for fracking activities, with a clearer independent fracking-related regulatory body, defined 
penalties for developers that breach environmental regulations, and greater attention paid to 
post-well closure environmental restoration. Doing so would better justify the environmental 
risks from fracking development in public policy, and provide stronger community 
safeguards.  
 In terms of economic redistribution for the redress of environmental distributive 
injustices, again there is some positive enactment of policy that upholds the PPFPE. 
Government aims to alleviate potential environmental injustices primarily through economic 
redistributive means Ð ensuring that councils and local communities are compensated for 
impacts experienced and through improving equality of economic opportunity vis--vis local 
skills development via a National College related to oil and gas industry skills in the North-
West of England. The economic benefits are explicitly local and community-related both in 
terms of providing profits to local authorities, direct spending on community benefits and 
ensuring greater equality of economic opportunity. However, without clearer guidance on the 
forms of payment, the definition of community and mechanisms both for fair distribution of 
resources and an independent facilitation of decision-making over expenditure (such as what 
forms of infrastructure or local community benefits are constructed and where), this system is 
potentially open to abuse. Not only could it prove coercive to communities suffering under 
economic austerity measures that curtail local government public expenditure, but could also 
prove divisive if vocally powerful minority activists and affluent residents with high stocks of 
social capital negotiate a greater share of benefits and a smaller share of burdens. Like other 
controversial environmental management issues such as the development of onshore wind 
(Cass, Walker, and Devine-Wright 2010), or nuclear waste repository siting (Rawles 2002), 
the issue of community benefits requires a nuanced and carefully managed distributive 
decision-making process to ensure that negative externalities and economic rebound effects 
donÕt further marginalise communities affected by environmental degradation from fracking 
activities. Thus, it behoves Government to not only reinforce community benefit provision 
through clearer legislative instrument (such as amending the Infrastructure Act to mandate 
Community Payback to create a Sovereign Wealth Fund), but to also stipulate clearer 
guidance on the types of payments, their distribution and guidance on benefit distribution 
through independent facilitation of spending decisions. 
In terms of information provision there are positive developments in terms of industry 
transparency, though in relation to public participation and consent it is clear that powers are 
being taken away from local communities. The UKOOG Charter on community engagement 
provides specific incentives for fracking companies to comply with transparent information 
communication to locally affected communities, though there are no mandated engagement 
practices that provide community decision-making control and hence, although information 
provision is nominally transparent with regard to industry openness about fracking site 
(Cotton and Devine-Wright 2012b)development, a number of democratic deficits in siting 
practices remain. Such democratic deficits are then reinforced by recent reductions to the 
powers of local authorities to halt fracking planning developments.  
 
Concluding remarks 
In this paper I argue that fracking-related planning policy development links to deeper 
problems of participative and consent-related injustice that relate to ongoing processes of 
planning reform (the Planning Act 2008, Localism Act 2011 and now the Infrastructure Act 
2015) that shorten decision-times across multiple planning consent regimes, and remove 
powers from local communities for decision-making control by rescaling decisions from local 
to national scales.  It is a continuation of the scalar dimensions of environmental injustice 
seen in relation to other controversial energy projects that fall under the rubric of nationally 
significant infrastructure such as energy-from-waste (Cotton 2014), nuclear power (Johnstone 
2014), electricity and gas transmission (Cotton and Devine-Wright 2013, Groves, Munday, 
and Yakovleva 2013) and most recently nuclear waste management following Cumbria 
County CouncilÕs decision to disengage with the volunteer site selection processes  
(Mackerron 2015, Blowers 2014). By making fracking an issue of national significance, an 
ethical justification of the public good is mobilised by political authorities to justify the 
violation of political equality in planning decisions. 
 When looking at the decision-making control of local communities, we see a 
complex and contradictory politics of localism. The localist agenda espoused by the former 
Coalition and current Conservative Governments, aims to empower communities to make 
decisions that affect them directly. On the surface, this has similarities with the consent and 
participative justice elements of Shrader-FrechetteÕs Principle of Prima Facie political 
Equality. However, in practice the localist planning agenda produces multiple layers of 
contradictory injustices. Government has abolished the regional tiers of spatial planning, and 
have shifted decision-making away from local government authorities towards direct 
engagement between communities and developers. At the same time, austerity economics has 
reduced capital funding to local authorities and to local infrastructure, and so this both 
curtails the power of local authorities to block applications and incentivises councils to accept 
economic development through business rate returns on fracking investments. As national 
consultation measures actively ignore public concerns over trespass law amendments, and as 
local council decisions are overruled by ministerial control under the rubric of nationally 
significant infrastructure decision-making rather than locally significant environmental 
protection, we see the powers of communities to halt or ameliorate environmental harm and 
distributive injustice weakened at multiple scales of environmental governance.  Only by 
reconfiguring planning consent regimes to ensure greater levels of community participation 
and decision-making control over site selection, in essence re-localising the scale of fracking 
decision-making, can such environmental injustices be overcome; and these will be key 
issues of environmental policy conflict as the shale gas industry continues to expand. 
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